The night of March 9-10, 1945, residents of Tokyo were awakened by the roar of American heavy bombers crossing overhead at only 5,000 to 9,000 feet. Tokyo had received scattered damage in earlier raids from bombers flying at 30,000 feet, but this night was different. American tactics had changed.

That night, 300 B-29 bombers flew from their bases in the Marianas Islands and dropped incendiary cluster bombs that created a conflagration that destroyed 16 square miles of the center of a highly-populated commercial and residential district of Tokyo. Perhaps 100,000 people died, more than the initial deaths from either atomic bombings in August.

The area-bombing of Japan with incendiary ordnance was initiated for good reason. B-29 raids against Japan had begun in June 1944, but they met with only limited success. Frequent cloudy weather conditions and high-altitude jet-stream winds made pinpoint bombing from 30,000 feet ineffective. Increased bombing accuracy could be accomplished at lower-altitude daylight attacks, but only at a great cost in lost bombers, which would be increasingly vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire and Japanese fighters.

Many large factories relied on small cottage industries that, even if located, could not be individually bombed. The low-level area incendiary raids solved this problem. Japanese cities, made mostly of wood, were highly vulnerable to incendiary attacks. Japanese firefighters and air defense were unprepared and overwhelmed.

The bombing of cities was initiated by both the Japanese and Germans in the beginning of the war. Americans were also familiar with outrageous and systematic Japanese war crimes against civilians and prisoners. With the horror and atrocities of the war mounting, few Americans had any concern about the bombing of Japanese cities.

In conjunction with the bombing campaign, the U.S. dropped tens of millions of leaflets on Japanese cities, warning of impending destruction from the air. The U.S. held the Japanese government responsible for evacuating civilians from cities. By the end of the war, 40 percent of Japanese urban areas had been burned out and over a half million civilians had died.

As an island nation with limited resources, Japan depended upon the importation of raw materials, food and, perhaps most important, oil. Japan had been starved by the U.S. submarine force, which obliterated the Japanese merchant marine. Nearly 25 percent of submarine sailors were killed in the process. U.S. bombers also dropped mines in Japanese harbors to curtail the movement of the few ships still serving the Empire. By July 1945, U.S. and British warships steamed offshore of mainland Japan and shelled factories and harbor installations.

During the war in Europe, German troops had surrendered when faced with annihilation. Not so with the Japanese. In battle after battle, in accordance with their warrior code, Japanese troops fought with incredible tenacity to the bitter end. Japanese surrender rates often did not surpass 1 or 2 percent. In late 1944, Japan initiated kamikaze/suicide attacks that visited extensive damage on U.S. ships.

The last invasion of the war, the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa in April 1945, was a terrible portent of what would occur if the main islands of Japan were invaded. Up to 200,000 Japanese died in the battle, including about a third of the civilian population. While significantly less than the Japanese losses, the U.S. suffered high casualty rates in the battle and the accompanying kamikaze attacks on supporting American ships.

Although starving and militarily and economically devastated, Japan had husbanded what fuel, aircraft and weapons it had for the final, apocalyptic battle on the main islands. American planners estimated that hundreds of thousands of American and millions of Japanese servicemen and civilians would be killed in an invasion. The U.S. also had good reason to fear that landings on the mainland would result in the execution of thousands of allied prisoners.

The Allies demanded and received unconditional surrender from Germany and insisted on the same from Japan. The option of a blockade and bombing of Japan was rejected. Given the Japanese history of refusing to surrender, this option did not promise an expedient end to the war. Moreover, a drawn-out blockade would result in additional deaths of undernourished civilians in territories occupied by Japan. Japanese civilian losses would also continue to mount as the result of increasing starvation and continued bombing attacks.

Proposals to conduct a demonstration detonation of one of the two atomic bombs available in August were rejected as tactically problematic and lacking in the shock value of an unannounced detonation over a major city, which was hoped to jar the intransigent Japanese leadership.

Even after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings and the intervention of the Soviet Union into the war, the Japanese leadership remained deadlocked on the proposal to surrender.

The devastating effect of the atomic bomb did provide a powerful argument to the peace faction of Japanese leadership. Ultimately, the emperor intervened and decided to accept the demand for “unconditional” surrender – with the added provision that he could remain as a figurehead.

On Aug. 15, the emperor informed his subjects of the decision to surrender, referencing the use of a “most cruel bomb,” and noting that “the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage.”

Two weeks later, the end of war formally took place on the deck on the battleship Missouri anchored in Tokyo Bay. The conclusion of the ceremony was accompanied by over a thousand American bombers and carrier planes flying in formation over the proceedings, heralding the beginning of a new age.

Tom Williamson is an attorney practicing in Durango with a lifelong interest in World War II. Reach him at tomdgolaw@gmail.com.